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Civil Rights in Ordinary Tort Cases: Race,
Gender, and the Calculation of Economic Loss
Martha Chamallas
Abstract
This article explores race and sex bias in the computation of damages for loss of
future earning capacity, an important component of economic loss in personal in-
jury cases. It analyzes recent cases in the United States and in Canada which reject
the use of race and sex-based tables to determine awards for female and minority
plaintiffs and explains the method used by the special master in the September
11th Compensation Fund. Chamallas explores objections to reform – from both
the “right” and the “left” — and makes the case for connecting civil rights princi-
ples to civil litigation.
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CIVIL RIGHTS IN ORDINARY TORT CASES: 
RACE, GENDER, AND THE CALCULATION 
OF ECONOMIC LOSS
Martha Chamallas*
These days “tort reform” has become a code word for initiatives 
that seek to limit liability and reduce the amount or type of damages 
plaintiffs receive.  It is a one way street that promises few benefits 
for injured parties or consumers. Tort reform has not always had this 
meaning.  Prior to the 1980s, it was more frequently linked to 
measures, such as comparative negligence, that sought to soften the
effect of restrictive doctrines and ease recovery for seriously injured 
parties.  At that time, reform was more reciprocal in structure.  For 
example, the reform of no-fault compensation for automobile 
accidents,1 or the earlier reform of workers= compensation,2 brought 
something for everyone—under the quid pro quo enacted by these 
no-fault regimes, plaintiffs were no longer required to prove 
negligence, while defendants in turn were liable only for economic 
losses.
In my view, the most influential tort reformers were the mid-
century legal realists, such as Leon Green3 and my former colleague, 
Wex S. Malone.4  For this group of legal reformers, legal formalism 
was the biggest enemy.5  They sought to reshape legal doctrine to 
*
 Robert J. Lynn Chair in Law, Moritz College of Law, The Ohio State 
University.
1. See Gary T. Schwartz, Auto No-Fault and First-Party Insurance: 
Advantages and Problems, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 611, 622–34 (2000).
2. See JOHN FABIAN WITT, THE ACCIDENTAL REPUBLIC 152–86 (2004) 
(discussing the history of workers= compensation statutes).
3. See, e.g., LEON GREEN, THE LITIGATION PROCESS IN TORT LAW (1965).
4. See, e.g., Wex S. Malone, Res Ipsa Loquitor and Proof by Inference—A 
Discussion of the Louisiana Cases, 4 LA. L. REV. 70 (1941); Wex S. Malone,
The Formative Era of Contributory Negligence, 41 ILL. L. REV. NW. U. 151 
(1946); Wex S. Malone, Ruminations on Cause in Fact, 9 STAN. L. REV. 60 
(1956).
5. For an analysis of legal realism and its response to legal formalism, see
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make tort law connect to real world experience. For example, when I 
was a student we used Leon Green=s casebook in torts.6  The cases in 
that book were not organized according to the familiar abstract 
conceptual categories, such as duty, breach, and proximate cause, but 
rather according to factual context: there was a section on cases 
against doctors and hospitals; a section on highway traffic accidents; 
and even a section on accidents involving fixed track vehicles.  This 
innovative structure showed how serious the authors were about 
linking tort doctrine to social experience, even if it made the book 
unteachable.
In my view, the reform project of the legal realists is not over. 
The unfinished work has to do with linking tort law to our 
developing understanding of civil and human rights.  Tellingly, 
Green=s casebook did not have a chapter on how a person=s race or 
gender might affect the outcome of a civil case.  Nor did it examine 
whether tort recoveries might be affected by the social identity of 
those suffering the loss.
As a professor who regularly teaches courses in torts and 
employment discrimination, I can attest that, even today, students 
rarely see a connection between “ordinary” civil litigation and civil 
rights.  If we look only at the surface of tort claims, issues of social 
justice—particularly equitable treatment of women and minority 
social groups—are generally visible only in certain intentional tort 
claims.  One of the more interesting developments of the last few 
decades is how older causes of action—most prominently battery, 
assault, false imprisonment, as well as the tort of intentional 
infliction of mental distress—have been deployed by sexual and 
racial harassment victims7 and victims of sexual and domestic 
violence8 to challenge longstanding patterns of oppression and 
Joseph William Singer, Legal Realism Now, 76 CAL. L. REV. 467 (1988) 
(reviewing LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE: 1927–1960 (1986)).
6. LEON GREEN ET AL., TORTS: CASES AND MATERIALS (1968).
7. See, e.g., Mae C. Quinn, Note, The Garden Path of Boyles v. Kerr and
Twyman v. Twyman: An Outrageous Response to Victims of Sexual 
Misconduct, 4 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 247 (1995); Leslie Bender, Teaching Torts 
as if Gender Matters: Intentional Torts, 2 VA. J. SOC. POL=Y & L. 115 (1994); 
Dennis P. Duffy, Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress and Employment 
at Will: The Case Against the ATortification@ of Labor and Employment Law, 
74 B.U. L. REV. 387, 397–420 (1994).
8. See, e.g., Ira Mark Ellman & Stephen D. Sugarman, Spousal Emotional 
http://law.bepress.com/osulwps/art16
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exploitation.  On this front, however, tort law has functioned mainly 
as a modest supplement to other remedies.  As Catharine MacKinnon 
observed in the late 1970s in her influential book arguing for a 
federal cause of action for sexual harassment, tort law tends not to 
see the social dimension of an injury and to conceptualize harm 
simplistically and dichotomously.9  In the world of torts, there is 
either economic loss on the one hand, or individual hurt feelings and 
emotional distress on the other.
Beyond these intentional tort cases, it is even harder for 
attorneys, judges, and experts to see a civil rights issue in what 
appears to be an ordinary tort claim. For many structural reasons—
most prominently the fact that civil rights attorneys tend to be a 
separate and distinct group from personal injury litigators10—even 
attorneys for plaintiffs are not often primed to detect ways in which 
the value of their clients’ injuries is infected by racial and gender 
bias or to discern how tort rules reflect a devaluation of particular 
social groups.  They may not recognize that the tort claims and types 
of damages least protected under the law are often the most vital for 
marginalized groups in society.  In my scholarship, for example, I 
have argued that negligent infliction of emotional harm and negligent 
interference with relationships are low in the hierarchy of 
compensable harms, in part because of their cognitive link to women 
and women=s injuries.11  Most recently, in the debate over damage 
caps, scholars have documented that non-economic damages are very 
important to women,12 particularly homemakers, because such 
women are not likely to recover large sums for wage replacement 
and other economic loss.13  Although some legitimately worry about 
Abuse as a Tort?, 55 MD. L. REV. 1268 (1996); Merle H. Weiner, Domestic 
Violence and the Per Se Standard of Outrage, 54 MD. L. REV. 183 (1995).
9. See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING 
WOMEN 173 (1979).
10. See Richard Abel, Civil Rights and Wrongs, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. ____
(2005).
11. See, e.g., Martha Chamallas, The Architecture of Bias: Deep Structures 
in Tort Law, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 463 (1998); Martha Chamallas & Linda K. 
Kerber, Women, Mothers and the Law of Fright, 88 MICH. L. REV. 814 (1990).
12. See, e.g., Lucinda M. Finley, The Hidden Victims of Tort Reform: 
Women, Children, and the Elderly, 53 EMORY L.J. 1263, 1266 (2004).
13. For discussions of the valuation of household labor and its effect on 
women, see MARTHA CHAMALLAS, INTRODUCTION TO FEMINIST LEGAL 
THEORY 192–99 (2d ed. 2003); REGINA GRAYCAR & JENNY MORGAN, THE 
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
18025-TEXT.NATIVE.1117119517PROF_CHAMALLAS_CLEAN.DOCCHAMALLAS_PRINTREADY5/26/20055/9/20054/14/2005 8:01 AM12:45:38 PM4:51 PM
104 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. XX:nnn
the commodification of intangible losses,14 in my view, the only 
thing worse than having one’s pain reduced to money is having one=s 
pain reduced to very little money.
Hidden race and gender bias in tort awards is also present in the 
standards used to calculate economic harm, a measurement that 
purports to be more precise than non-pecuniary losses.  In many tort 
cases, particularly those involving severe injuries to persons who 
have not yet established a track record of employment, there is much 
discretion in determining the all-important category of loss of future 
income.  Particularly with the growing popularity of caps on non-
economic damages,15 future earning capacity can be a big-ticket item 
of damages.  It is also of great social importance because it 
represents a measure of an individual=s potential.
When I served as a member of the Iowa and Pennsylvania task 
forces on gender and race bias in the courts, I was surprised to 
discover that it is commonplace for expert witnesses to rely on 
gender and race-based tables to determine both the number of years 
that a plaintiff would likely have worked (work/life expectancy) and 
the likely annual income the plaintiff would have earned.16  Because 
the measure of lost earning capacity is largely a function of these two 
variables,17 discounted to present value, the choice of tables is 
HIDDEN GENDER OF LAW 126–38 (2d ed. 2002).
14. See Richard L. Abel, Torts, in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE 
CRITIQUE 445, 456 (D. Kairys ed., 3d ed. 1998).
15. As of January 2004, 26 states had caps on non-economic damages.  
SENATE JUDICIARY COMM., SUMMARY OF STATE LAWS CAPS 
ON NON-ECONOMIC DAMAGES, http://greenleaf.pasenategop.com/PDF/
SummaryofStateLaws.pdf (revised Jan. 28, 2004).  President Bush has also 
been pushing for passage of a federal $250,000 cap on non-economic damages 
in medical malpractice actions. See Jessica Heslam, Dad Seeks Prez=s Ear on 
Malpractice Caps, BOSTON HERALD, Feb. 2, 2005, at 23.
16. EQUALITY IN THE COURTS TASK FORCE, STATE OF IOWA, FINAL 
REPORT 118 (1993); PA. SUPREME COURT COMM. ON RACE AND GENDER BIAS 
IN THE JUSTICE SYS., FINAL REPORT 236–37 (2003) [hereinafter PA. FINAL 
REPORT]. 
 For a more comprehensive discussion of the methods for calculating 
lost earning capacity, see Martha Chamallas, Questioning the Use of Race-
Specific and Gender-Specific Economic Data in Tort Litigation, 63 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 73 (1994).
17. See JEROME H. NATES ET AL., 2 DAMAGES IN TORT ACTIONS 10.30–.34 
(2002); PAUL M. DEUTSCH & FREDERICK A. RAFFA, 9 DAMAGES IN TORT 
ACTIONS, 110.10 (2002). As discussed below, predicting the future income of 
a young tort victim who has yet to select a career path typically also depends 
http://law.bepress.com/osulwps/art16
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crucial.
Race and gender-based tables are in effect race-specific and 
gender-specific assessments, comparing, for example, women only to 
other women, blacks to blacks, and men to men.  Thus, the earning 
potential of an individual woman plaintiff is measured by reference 
to others in her gender group.  This saddles nonconforming women 
and racial minorities with generalizations about their group, the very 
kind of stereotyping that anti-discrimination laws were meant to 
prohibit.  For example, if in the past women have taken several years 
out of the labor market to raise children, gender-based worklife 
tables predict that they will continue to do so in the future.18  If 
minority men have historically been incarcerated at a much higher 
rate than white men, race-based worklife estimates predict that they 
will continue to work fewer years than whites.19  As a practical 
matter, the use of race and gender-based tables results in 
significantly lower awards for minority men and women of all races. 
It also means that historical patterns of discrimination in the labor 
market are replicated in tort awards, even though the labor force 
participation of women and minorities may be changing rapidly.20
Let me give you an example from a recent case.  In U.S. v. 
Bedonie,21 an expert testified that the decedent, a young Native 
American man who had just graduated from high school would have 
earned approximately $433,000 in his lifetime.22  The expert arrived 
at this figure by first estimating what the average high school 
graduate earns and then multiplying that amount by 58% because 
58% was the average ratio of the wages for Native American males 
to white males.23  On its own motion, the court asked the expert to 
calculate the amount the deceased would have earned without 
making any adjustment.24  That figure was approximately 
$744,000.25  In the same case, a calculation using a race and sex 
on the level of education the victim would likely have attained, but for the 
accident.  See infra notes 108–109 and accompanying text.
18. See Chamallas, supra note 16, at 81–82.
19. See id. at 81, 115.
20. Id. at 88.
21. 317 F. Supp. 2d 1285 (D. Utah 2004).
22. Id. at 1313.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 1314.
25. Id.
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
18025-TEXT.NATIVE.1117119517PROF_CHAMALLAS_CLEAN.DOCCHAMALLAS_PRINTREADY5/26/20055/9/20054/14/2005 8:01 AM12:45:38 PM4:51 PM
106 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. XX:nnn
adjustment for lost earning potential made a huge difference when 
the decedent was a Native American woman.  Unadjusted, her 
earning potential was estimated to be approximately $308,000, 
versus only $171,000 when the calculation was based on gender and 
race.26
Significantly, although the expert in that case had performed 
thousands of lost income analyses, he testified that “no one had ever 
asked him to provide race and sex-neutral calculations in a wrongful 
death case.”27 It seems that the lawyers had relied on the economists, 
and the economists never questioned the appropriateness of using 
race and sex to predict earning power.  This is a dramatic 
demonstration of how race and sex bias can sometimes be eclipsed 
by statistics.
In some contexts, the use of race and gender-based economic 
data can result in a systematic undervaluation of recurring types of 
injuries. For example, legal commentators have analyzed the impact 
of using race-based calculations in lead paint litigation.28  Lead 
poisoning is often caused by ingesting paint chips or dust, likely to 
be found in older, deteriorating buildings in low-income 
neighborhoods.29  Depressed awards for plaintiffs derive from the 
fact that the population of lead paint victims is disproportionately 
young children, typically poor, African-American or Hispanic 
children.30  This means that, in making assessments of the lost future 
earning capacity of these children, there is often a lack of 
individualized evidence that indicates what career path the plaintiff 
would have taken and what he or she would likely have earned over 
a lifetime.  In such cases, resort to statistics may well be the best 
available method of prediction.  When lost earnings are calculated 
using race-based tables, however, whether to measure average 
earnings or worklife expectancy, the awards are considerably lower 
26. Id.
27. Id. at 1315.
28. See, e.g., Laura Greenberg, Note, Compensating the Lead Poisoned 
Child: Proposals for Mitigating Discriminatory Damage Awards, 28 B.C. 
ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 429 (2001); Jennifer Wriggins, Genetics, IQ, 
Determinism, and Torts: The Example of Discovery in Lead Exposure 
Litigation, 77 B.U. L. REV. 1025 (1997).
29. Greenberg, supra note 28, at 432–33.
30. Id. at 430, 432–33 (children under five years of age are most susceptible 
to lead poisoning).
http://law.bepress.com/osulwps/art16
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than they would be for comparably injured white victims.  
Defendants in such cases, typically landlords or government housing 
authorities, thus pay far less than they would if their victims were 
predominantly white, middle-class children.  Additionally, because it 
is cheaper to injure poor minority children, there is less incentive for 
defendants to take measures to clean up toxic hazards in the 
neighborhoods most affected by lead paint.
The reliance on race and sex-based economic data, and the 
comparable practice of making race and sex adjustments to arrive at 
an estimate of lost earning potential, is the equivalent of using 
explicit race and sex classifications.  This is not subtle 
discrimination, but overt discrimination of the kind that the 
constitution and anti-discrimination laws have long outlawed, or at 
least have made hard to justify.  It is well established in 
constitutional law that race-based classifications trigger strict 
scrutiny31 and that sex-based classifications trigger a stringent 
intermediate scrutiny.32  Under Title VII, moreover, virtually all 
race-based classifications are prohibited,33 while sex-based 
classifications are allowed only in the rarest of cases in which sex is 
a bona fide occupational qualification for a particular job.34  Notably, 
in City of Los Angeles Department of Water and Power v. Manhart,35
the U.S. Supreme Court held that sex-based actuarial tables could not 
be used to justify requiring female employees to pay higher monthly 
contributions to an employer-run retirement fund, despite the fact 
that women as a group live longer than men.36  This strong distaste 
31. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (landmark 
case using strict scrutiny to determine validity of racial classification).  Even 
when the classification reflects “reality” in the sense of acknowledging that 
race often matters in shaping human behavior, the Supreme Court has insisted 
on applying strict scrutiny.  See Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432–33 
(1984) (race of stepparent could not be considered in child custody decision 
because the law could not give effect to private prejudice).
32. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531 (1996) (to withstand 
intermediate scrutiny, justification for sex-based classification must be 
Aexceedingly persuasive@).
33. See, e.g., Ferrill v. Parker Group, Inc., 168 F.3d 468, 473–74 (11th Cir. 
1999).  The exception is for narrowly tailored affirmative action programs. See
United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 206–08 (1979).
34. See UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 201 (1991) (BFOQ 
exception based on gender reaches only special situations).
35. 435 U.S. 702 (1978).
36. Id.
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for explicit race and sex classifications, however, has not yet carried 
over into ordinary tort cases.  Instead, when experts rely on race or 
gender-based statistics to calculate tort damages, we tend not to 
notice the discrimination and to accept it as natural and 
unproblematic.
I recently read an interesting historical study by Jennifer 
Wriggins of wrongful death cases in Louisiana decided in the first 
half of the twentieth century.37  In several appellate cases, the court
reduced an award for a black victim after comparing it to the amount 
that other black victims had previously recovered.  Today, we would 
likely regard such explicit segregation in evaluating awards as 
clearly inappropriate, as an artifact of a pre-civil rights era.  
However, reliance on gender and race-based tables amounts to an 
updated version of this same discriminatory practice.38  The 
prohibited segregative move behind each method is its reliance on 
the depressed status of the racial or gender group as the benchmark 
for an award to an individual plaintiff.
The illegitimacy of practice is perhaps most evident when we 
consider the difficulty courts and juries face when the injured party is 
biracial or multiracial.  One such prominent case is Wheeler Tarpeh-
Doe v. United States,39 involving the categorization of a biracial male 
child, Nyenpan Tarpeh-Doe, whose father was Liberian and whose 
white mother lived in the United States.  In that case, the court was 
confronted with the uncomfortable question of whether it should 
select the Awhite@ tables or the Ablack@ tables to determine lost 
earning capacity. The opinion was notable for its time because the 
court simply refused to decide whether Nyenpan was black or white 
for purposes of choosing the appropriate statistic.  Instead, the court 
decided to use blended tables combining persons of all races.40
37. See Jennifer Wriggins, The Color of Injury: Race, Gender and Torts in 
the First Half of the Century (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
38. See generally Reva B. Siegel, AThe Rule of Love@: Wife Beating as 
Pre rogative and Privacy, 105 YALE L. J. 2117 (1996); CHAMALLAS, supra
note 13, at 10–11 (discussing reproduction of patterns of male dominance in 
updated forms).
39. 771 F. Supp. 427 (D.D.C. 1991), rev’d on other grounds, 28 F.3d 120 
(D.C. Cir. 1994).
40. Id. at 455.  The court also decided to use gender-neutral tables.  Id.  For 
a discussion of this aspect of the case, see infra note 134134135 and 
accompanying text.
http://law.bepress.com/osulwps/art16
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In an earlier article, I argued that the use of race or gender-based 
estimates is an unconstitutional practice that amounts to telling the 
jury that it is permissible to treat men and women, or whites and 
minorities differently.41  Imagine, for example, a state legislature that 
adopted a statute compelling or authorizing a jury to make a racial 
adjustment when calculating an award for a member of a minority 
group whose average member earns less than a white person.  If such 
legislation would be regarded as unconstitutional, the same 
constitutional infirmity applies to an expert=s use of explicitly race-
based economic data in a civil case.  I submit that there is no less
state action when the court permits an expert to base his calculations 
on race-based tables or to make race-based adjustments in arriving at 
an estimate.42  However, even if a court were reluctant to declare that 
the Constitution forbids the use of race or gender-based economic 
assessments in tort cases, it still retains the discretion to refuse to 
admit such assessments on public policy grounds.  Some courts may 
prefer this approach because it avoids the constitutional question, but 
nevertheless allows the common law to grow incrementally in a 
manner consistent with constitutional norms.43
When I first starting writing about this issue, I received 
correspondence from attorneys indicating that they had been 
successful in making jury arguments in individual cases that the 
damage award should not be lower simply because the victim was a 
young woman or a member of a racial minority. In one case, a 
lawyer represented two young children—a brother and a sister—who 
had been severely injured in a car accident. The plaintiffs’ attorney 
successfully argued that the girl=s award should not be lower than her 
brother=s.44  But there had not yet been a clear trend in the courts that 
taking race or sex into account was either unconstitutional or against 
41. See Chamallas, supra note 16.
42. Id. at 105–11.
43. See, e.g., United States v. Bedonie, 317 F. Supp. 2d 1285, 1319 (D. 
Utah 2001) (avoiding reaching constitutional question and exercising its 
discretion to use blended tables to further public policy of Afavor[ing] victims 
of violent crime and against the possible perpetuation of impermissible 
stereotypes@).
44. For a reported case in which a Canadian court awarded the same 
amount of economic damages to a brother and sister injured by their mother=s 
abuse, see Cho v. Cho, [2003] 36 R.F.L. (5th) 79 (Ont. Sup. Ct. J.), 2003 
CarswellOnt 708 (Can.).
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public policy.
Recently, however, arguments against race and sex-based 
calculations have been making headway.  In the United States, the 
movement has largely occurred outside the torts arena, specifically 
within the context of the September 11th Victim Compensation 
Fund45 and an important criminal case involving mandatory victim 
restitution.46  In Canada, however, broader tort reform has already 
begun to take hold.  In several significant cases, Canadian courts 
have rejected female-specific actuarial tables, opting for more 
egalitarian approaches.47  The pressing question in that country 
seems to have shifted from whether gender fairness ought to be a 
consideration in calculating economic loss, to how best to implement 
gender equality.
Let me start with the developments in the United States.  The 
authorizing legislation for the September 11th Victim Compensation 
Fund gave Kenneth Feinberg, the Fund’s Special Master, 
considerable discretion to determine the amounts that families of the 
victims would receive when they elected to give up their right to sue 
in tort and instead to take compensation under the no-fault Fund.48
Initially, Feinberg indicated that in calculating economic loss, he 
would rely on gender-based tables as is frequently done in tort 
litigation.49  It should be noted that although the prototypical 9/11 
victim is a man, 739 women were killed in the September 11th
attacks.50  During the comment period before adoption of the final 
rule governing distribution under the fund, however, the NOW Legal 
Defense Fund objected to the use of gender-based worklife 
45. See Martha Chamallas, The September 11th Victim Compensation 
Fund: Rethinking the Damages Element in Injury Law, 71 TENN. L. REV. 51 
(2003).
46. See Bedonie, 317 F. Supp. 2d 1285; see also Childers v. Sec’y of Health 
& Human Servs., No. 96-194V, 1999 WL 218893, at *15–*18 (Fed. Cl. 1999) 
(special master rejects gender-based worklife estimate in favor of neutral 
figure for all workers in claim under the National Vaccine Injury 
Compensation Program).
47. See Elizabeth Adjin-Tettey, Replicating and Perpetuating Inequalities 
in Personal Injury Claims Through Female-Specific Contingencies, 49 
MCGILL L.J. 309 (2004) (collecting cases).
48. Chamallas, supra note 45, at 69.
49. Martha F. Davis, Valuing Women: A Case Study, 23 WOMEN=S RTS. L. 
REP. 219, 220 (2002).
50. Chamallas, supra note 45, at 69.
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expectancy tables and urged Feinberg to reconsider his 
methodology.51
Feinberg ultimately agreed with NOW Legal Defense that the 
awards should not disadvantage the families of women and set about 
fashioning a remedy.  In my scholarship, I have argued that gender-
neutral or blended tables should be used for both men and women.52
This would generally have the effect of raising awards for women, 
but lowering awards for men.53  Rather than use this method, 
however, Feinberg decided to use male tables for both men and 
women, thus raising the awards to families of female victims without 
lowering the awards to the families of male victims.54  This solution 
was in keeping with the Act=s policy of being generous to the 9/11 
families, but did not seriously deplete the Fund, because there were 
comparatively fewer female victims.
The next important development occurred in May 2004, when 
Judge Cassel of the federal district court in Utah was faced with the 
task of determining how much compensation family members of two 
murder victims should recover under the Mandatory Victims 
Restitution Act.55  In U.S. v. Bedonie, as described earlier,56 the 
murder victims were both Native American, one male, one female.  
The court decided that as a matter of public policy, no downward 
adjustments for either race or sex should be made to the awards.57
Unlike the 9/11 Special Master, however, Judge Cassel decided to 
use blended, gender and race-neutral tables to determine 
compensation, rather than to peg the awards to the average, white 
male earnings.58
What I find most significant about these two developments is 
that when the issue was squarely raised, the connection between civil 
damages and civil rights was recognized by the both the Special 
Master and Judge Cassel.  I realize that the September 11th Fund 
may be unusual because the 9/11 victims are often regarded as 
51. Id. at 71.
52. See, e.g., Chamallas, supra note 16, at 122–23.
53. Id.
54. Chamallas, supra note 45, at 71.
55. U.S. v. Bedonie, 317 F. Supp. 2d 1285 (D. Utah 2004).
56. See supra notes 21–27 and accompanying text.
57. Bedonie, 317 F. Supp. 2d at 1319.
58. Id.
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
18025-TEXT.NATIVE.1117119517PROF_CHAMALLAS_CLEAN.DOCCHAMALLAS_PRINTREADY5/26/20055/9/20054/14/2005 8:01 AM12:45:38 PM4:51 PM
112 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. XX:nnn
heroes, not simply ordinary tort victims,59 and the money to finance 
the Fund came from the general treasury.60 In the restitution cases, 
we again had very sympathetic plaintiffs—the families of a murder 
victim—and perhaps less concern for imposing disproportionate 
liability on the defendants given their status as a convicted felons.61
In my view, however, once the assumptions behind gender-
based or race-based tables and race or sex adjustments are made 
visible, they will no longer be regarded as acceptable for use in civil 
litigation generally.  The Canadian experience on this point is 
instructive.  Starting first in the courts in British Columbia,62 and 
then spreading to Ontario,63 courts have responded positively to 
arguments by plaintiffs= attorneys that expert calculations of 
economic loss should be scrutinized to ensure  that they are not based 
on assumptions or tables that are unfair to individual women or that 
serve to perpetuate patterns of gender inequality.
The most prominent case in Canada to date is probably Walker 
v. Ritchie,64 decided by the Ontario Superior Court in 2003.  In many 
respects, Walker is a good example of an ordinary tort case, if the 
common tragedy of grievous personal injury can ever be classified as 
ordinary.  Stephanie Walker was seventeen years old when she was 
injured in a serious car accident.65  She suffered a head injury and 
brain damage, which manifested itself in residual paralysis and 
irreversible cognitive deficits.66  The court determined that as a result 
of the accident Stephanie would be permanently disabled and unable 
59. Chamallas, supra note 45 at 76.
60. See Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act, Pub. L. No 
107-42, 406(b), 115 Stat. 230, 240 (2001).
61. Bedonie, 317 F. Supp. 2d at 1312 (“If an economic tortfeasor may not 
profit from his own wrong, the same principle applies, a fortiori, to . . . a 
violent criminal.  Indeed, violent criminals have far less right to complain 
about uncertainties left in the wake of their terrible crimes.”).
62. See, e.g., Shaw (Guardian ad litem of) v. Arnold [1998] B.C.J. No. 
2834 (B.C.S.C.) (QL), 1998 CarswellBC 2731 (Can.); Tucker (Guardian ad 
litem of) v. Asleson [1993] 102 D.L.R. (4th) 518, 528, 78 B.C.L.R. (2d) 173 
(B.C.C.A.), 1993 CarswellBC 94 (Can.).
63. See, e.g., Walker v. Ritchie [2003] O.J. No. 18 (Ont. Sup. Ct. J.) (QL), 
2003 CarswellOnt 10 (Can.); Cho v. Cho [2003] 36 R.F.L. (5th) 79 (Ont. Sup. 
Ct. J.), 2003 CarswellOnt 708 (Can.).
64. [2003] O.J. No. 18 (Ont. Sup. Ct. J.) (QL)(Can.).
65. Id. at ¶ 3.
66. Id. at ¶ 43.
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to obtain competitive employment during her lifetime.67
At the time of the injury, Stephanie was in her last year of high 
school and did not yet have any definite plans to attend college.68
The court learned that she was an above-average student and an 
outstanding athlete69 and that her two older sisters had attended 
university and become teachers.70  However, as is often the case 
when victims are injured when they are children or teenagers, no one 
could predict with certainty what path Stephanie=s life would have 
taken if she had not been injured.
The court first determined that given the severity of her injuries,
Stephanie was entitled to receive $250,000 for non-economic 
damages, the maximum allowable under Canada=s capped recovery 
system.71  Before calculating a figure for lost future earning capacity, 
however, the court had to choose between an expert-derived figure 
based on average earnings for female university graduates 
($1,070,694) and another expert=s figure based on average earnings 
for all university graduates ($1,690,250).72  In opting to base 
recovery on the higher blended figure,73 the court cited prior 
decisions which had criticized the use of gender-based tables because 
of their potential to perpetuate the effects of gender-based wage 
disparity and for their failure to take account of trends toward a 
narrowing of the wage gap in Canada and increased labor force 
participation by women.74  The court also preferred the blended 
approach because it saved it the additional step of having to decide 
whether any upward adjustment should be made to the plaintiff=s 
award.75  Some courts in Canada have, along these lines, attempted 
to infuse gender fairness into the damage award for a female plaintiff 
67. Id. at ¶ 123.
68. Id. at ¶ 44, 128.
69. Id. at ¶ 44.
70. Id. at ¶ 76–80.
71. Id. at ¶ 99.
72. Id.
73. The court did, however, make a downward adjustment of 10% to 
account for the contingency that Stephanie might not have chosen to attend a 
university and another deduction of $100,000, the amount the court estimated 
Stephanie would earn by engaging in minimum wage (non-competitive) labor 
suitable for persons with her disability.  Id. at ¶¶ 141–42.  The award for future 
wage loss was thus reduced to $1,421,225.  Id. at ¶ 143.
74. Id. at ¶ 133, 134.
75. Id. at ¶ 135.
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by “grossing up” an award based on female-specific actuarial tables 
to reflect the possibility that plaintiff might not have followed one of 
the typical career paths for a woman, choosing a male-oriented 
career instead, complete with higher earnings.76
What is striking to me about Walker is the practical importance 
of this one detail of damages computation.  In Stephanie’s case, the 
decision to use a gender-neutral approach was worth approximately 
$600,000, more than double the amount she received for non-
economic damages.  The case highlights just how much discretion 
lies in the hands of courts, juries, and experts in computing damages 
and shows that the treatment of gender can be as significant as the 
individual facts of the case.
Canadian courts have also employed other approaches to infuse 
gender equity into damage awards for female tort victims. Similar to 
the approach of the 9/11 Special Master,77 some trial courts in 
Canada have used male tables to calculate awards for female 
plaintiffs,78 presumably because such tables are regarded as free of 
gender bias and better reflect what the earnings will be for both men 
and women in the future.79  Some commentators in Canada also 
prefer the use of male tables over blended tables80 and have 
expressed concern that courts might be tempted to use blended tables 
only for female plaintiffs.81  It should be noted, however, that the 
standards used for damage computation in Canadian courts are quite 
varied and are not always internally consistent. In one case, for 
example, a court used male tables to compute earnings loss for a 
female plaintiff and then made a 10% Afemale-specific@ discount to 
take account of the contingency that women will continue to earn 
76. See Adjin-Tettey, supra note 47, at 316 n.13.
77. See text accompanying supra note 54.
78. See, e.g., MacCabe v. Westlock Roman Catholic Separate School Dist. 
No. 110 (1998), [1999] 226 A.R. 1 (Alta. Q.B.), 1998 CarswellAlta 897 (Can.), 
rev’d in part (2001), [2002] 293 A.R. 41, at ¶ 101–09, 2001 CarswellAlta 1364 
(Alta. C.A.) (Can.); Tucker (Guardian ad litem of) v. Asleson (unreported) 
Vancouver Reg. No. B871616 (April 25, 1991, B.C.S.C.)(Can.), discussed in
Jamie Cassels, (In)equality and the Law of Tort: Gender, Race and the 
Assessment of Damages, 17 ADVOCATES= Q. 158, 182–84 (1995).
79. See Adjin-Tettey, supra note 47, at 321.
80. See, e.g., id.; Ken Cooper-Stephenson, Damages for Loss of Working 
Capacity for Women, 43 SASK. L. REV. 7 (1978–79).
81. See Anjin-Tettey, supra note 47, at 318.
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less than men.82
Although the issue has been percolating for over two decades, 
gender fairness in the computation of damages is now highly visible 
in Canadian tort law and is likely to gain greater visibility in the 
United States as soon as the developments in related areas of 
compensation law migrate into tort law.  Not surprisingly, the issue 
of gender and race equity has also recently caught the attention of 
forensic economists who are engaged in such projects as developing 
gender-neutral worklife tables and revising their methods for 
conducting economic loss appraisals.83  The pace of change in this 
area is likely to accelerate as experts become accustomed to 
challenging gender and race-specific estimates and stand ready to 
offer alternatives to the court.
Like so many important issues of law and public policy, 
proposals to change the method of calculating economic loss in tort 
law are subject to objections from both the “right” and the “left.”  
The objections on the right have been most visible and center on 
concerns for accuracy.84  They are typically grounded in the claim 
that gender and race-based calculations do no more than mirror 
reality and place tort victims in the position they would have 
occupied absent the discrimination.
The concerns on the left have mainly appeared in the Canadian 
commentary.  They sound a more progressive tone and stress the 
incompleteness of this type of incremental tort reform.  The worry 
here is that change will reach only a fraction of injured people and 
will do little substantively to redistribute income more generally in 
society.85  For reasons I summarize below, I believe that these 
objections can be, and indeed, have already been adequately 
countered.  The developments in Canada suggest that as more light is 
shed on the issue, the debate in the United States is also likely to 
shift from whether any change is necessary to what specific 
alternatives should be adopted.
82. See Gray v. Macklin (2000), 4 C.C.L.T. (3d) 13, at ¶ 197 (Ont. Sup. Ct. 
J.) (Can.).
83. See Kurt V. Kruger, Worklife at Home and in the Labor Force, Paper 
presented at the Conference of the National Association of Forensic 
Economics, Eastern Economic Association, Session on Gender and Race 
Issues in Forensic Economics (March 4, 2005).
84. See infra notes 86–120.
85. See infra notes 121–133133134 and accompanying text.
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In assessing the objections that have been made to reform, I start 
with a specific proposal in mind, namely, that in cases in which a tort 
victim has no sufficient track record of employment from which an 
individual assessment of earnings potential can be drawn, an estimate 
of future earning capacity should be made only from gender and 
race-neutral statistics (i.e., blended tables) and that no specific 
gender or racial downward adjustments should be made to reflect the 
depressed earnings potential of the group.  As so framed, the 
proposal is informed by constitutional considerations, in that it 
singles out explicit racial and gender classifications—classifications 
that have been established as constitutionally suspect or disfavored—
and does not address other potentially troubling factors, such as the 
impact of social class and family background on earnings potential.  
Despite its limits, however, the proposal is far from modest: if 
adopted, it will make a dramatic difference in recoveries in certain 
cases, precisely because it does address two important social 
identities that have historically shaped the workplace and the larger 
society. Moreover, as mentioned earlier,86 courts have the discretion 
to adopt the reform proposal as a matter of public policy in tort 
litigation, without reaching the constitutional question.
The most familiar objections to abandoning gender and race-
specific data are generally couched in terms of “accuracy” and at 
first blush may seem to fit well with the compensation principle of 
restitutio in integrum, the principle that seeks to restore the accident 
victim to the condition he or she would have occupied absent the 
accident.  This criticism is most often aligned with the more general 
tort theory of corrective justice, which sees tort law as aimed at 
righting individual wrongs and as focused on the personal 
responsibility of the defendant to rectify conduct causing harm.87  In 
its starkest form, the objection based on accuracy starts from the 
premise that the only legitimate goal of tort law is to restore the 
victim to the status quo ante.  The next step is to assert that gender 
and race disparities are located in the larger society (e.g., prevailing 
wage rates) and that accident victims should not seek compensation 
from defendants to make up for societal inequities. Thus, the 
86. See supra note 43.
87. See, e.g., Jules L. Coleman, The Practice of Corrective Justice, in
PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW 56, 56 (David G. Owen ed., 
1995).
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argument goes, if the statistics show that women and minorities work 
fewer years than white men and/or make lower averages wages, tort 
damages based on those statistics are a fair and accurate 
measurement of what they likely lost as a result of the accident.
However, both the starting premise of this argument and the 
conclusions that purportedly follow from it have been sharply 
questioned and do not hold up under scrutiny.  It is perhaps easiest to 
see the flaws in the conclusions.  Even some critics of reform 
acknowledge that current practices are deficient insofar as the race 
and gender-based statistics upon which estimates are based do not 
mirror current or future realities. As one critic of reform aptly noted: 
Astatistical evidence is cogent only if it is recent.@88  Briefly stated, 
there are two important respects in which statistics about average 
worklife and average earnings can produce an unreliable guide to 
future earning capacity: (1) if they are outdated and reflect patterns 
of the past, rather than the present, and (2) if they are not refined to 
take account of future trends affecting the gender or racial group, 
even if they accurately describe the status quo at the time of trial.
Thus, one nagging problem has been that the worklife tables 
used by courts and experts to project the length of time a plaintiff is 
expected to participate in the workforce are often outdated.  In public 
testimony before the Pennsylvania Supreme Court=s Committee on 
Gender and Racial Bias, a forensic economist explained that official 
worklife estimates were first published by the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics (BLS) in 1982 and were most recently updated and 
expanded in 1986.89  He went on to explain that because labor force 
participation for women has increased dramatically since 1986, it is 
commonly recognized that the BLS tables are obsolete.90  As a result, 
economic researchers have created worklife tables based on more 
recent unpublished data from the Current Population Studies (CPS), 
such as the updated tables created by Ciecka, Donley and Goldman 
in 1998.91  In making economic loss estimates, therefore, experts 
may be forced to choose between the official, outdated estimates and 
88. See Mitchell McInnes, The Gendered Earnings Proposal in Tort Law, 
77 CANADIAN B. REV. 153, 154.
89. See PA. FINAL REPORT, supra note 16, at 237 (reporting testimony of 
Robert A. Wallace).
90. Id. at 238.
91. Id.
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more current estimates that are not as widely accepted in practice. In 
this economist’s view, experts are sometimes hesitant to use the 
more current data because they fear that the courts will reject any 
estimate of economic loss that is not based on official sources.92  On 
this point, it is interesting to note that because of concerns for 
timeliness of the data, the 9/11 Special Master decided to rely on the 
unofficial, updated tables prepared by Ciecka, Donley and Goldman, 
rather than to use the official government data.93  As noted earlier, 
however, he elected to use the male tables to calculate loss of future 
income capacity for both male and female victims.94
Of course, insofar as worklife estimates are outdated, they will 
not provide a reliable guide to worklife expectancy for either men or 
women. However, because there has been such an appreciable rise in 
women’s labor force participation in the past few decades—because 
more women are working and are taking less time out of the paid 
workforce to raise children95—the use of outdated statistics ends up 
disproportionately disadvantaging female tort victims and their 
continued use clearly cannot be justified by any concern for 
accuracy.
A somewhat more difficult problem derives from the fact there 
is no unfailingly accurate way to predict the future. Even if worklife 
tables and tables of average wages were to be compiled from the 
most recent data on the day before trial, without further refinement, 
they would still not generate precisely accurate figures from which to 
derive future estimates, unless we were to assume that there would 
be no changes in the labor force participation rate of women or in the 
size of the wage gap between the relevant social groups. Particularly 
when losses are projected decades into the future, as is the case when 
the plaintiff is injured as a child or young adult, any estimation of 
92. Id.
93. September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001, 67 Fed. Reg. 
11238 (March 13, 2002).
94. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
95. For example, from 1985–1996, the labor force participation for women 
grew from 54.5% to 58.8%, with the biggest increase coming from women 
who were also mothers. Howard V. Hayghe, Developments in Women’s Labor 
Force Participation, MONTHLY LAB. REV. (Bureau of Labor Statistics), Sept. 
1997, at 42, 45–46. Although the rate of increase is not as high as it was in the 
1970s, the trend was described as “continuing, long-term labor force 
participation rate gains for women, particularly those with children.”  Id. at 46.
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future trends is bound to be contestable and contested, provided only 
that the parties understand the methods of computation.  Thus, 
forensic economists know that the models used in loss appraisals 
must include variables to account for social change, notably changes 
in the pattern of women=s working lives and the likely narrowing of 
the wage gap.  Several courts in both the United States and Canada 
have also recognized that if historical data are not refined to take 
account of such future trends, the effect will be to saddle historically 
disadvantaged groups with the burdens of the past and to compensate 
them at below the market rate, simply because they were unlucky 
enough to become tort victims.96
Once we acknowledge that the tables must be refined and cannot 
be used “off the shelf,” we have passed imperceptibly from a 
discussion about historical facts to a debate about the influence of 
social forces, the direction and rate of social change, and matters of 
judgment and interpretation upon which there is no societal or 
professional consensus.  Thus, although most people seem to think 
that the gender wage gap will narrow in the future, there is no 
agreement about when and whether parity will occur.  Likewise, no 
confident judgments can be made about how much time women will 
take away from the paid workforce to raise children twenty years 
from now.  This is not to say that economists are not capable of 
making reasoned and informed estimates on these matters.97  Rather, 
it is merely to highlight that when economic models are uncritically 
accepted as accurate predictions of the future, it tends to mask the 
fact the law is handing off this difficult judgment to an outside 
professional group, a group with no special expertise in matters of 
gender and race inequality.
More fundamentally, the objections about accuracy fail to 
appreciate that predictions about the future have a way of 
simultaneously affecting the present and constructing the future.  
Take a small example relating to the narrowing of the gender wage 
96. See, e.g., Reilly v. United States, 665 F. Supp. 976, 997 (D. R.I. 1987); 
Reilly v. United States, 863 F.2d 149, 167 (1st Cir. 1988); Childers v. Sec’y of 
Health and Human Servs., No. 96-194V, 1999 WL 218893, at *17 (1999); 
Audet (Guardian ad litem of) v. Bates, [1998] B.C.J. No. 1068 at ¶ 76 
(B.C.S.C.) (QL), 1998 CarswellBC 644 (Can.).
97. In fact, when economists rely on blended tables, they must still refine 
the tables to account for future trends and certainly cannot be blind to trends 
among women in arriving at an estimate for the population as a whole.
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gap.  Some Canadian courts have noted that the size of the gender 
gap in wages in part depends on the sector in which the plaintiff 
would have been employed, noting that pay equity initiatives have 
been more prevalent in public employment and in organized 
workplaces.98  However, the degree to which the pay equity 
movement will take hold in firms in the private sector is not wholly 
removed from the debate over computation of damages in tort cases. 
As one commentator remarked “in compensating both males and 
females at the same rate, tort law would make a dramatic statement 
regarding the type of equality to which it aspires.”99  And it is not 
fanciful to believe that the example set by tort law would generate 
additional pressure for pay equity in the workplace, similar to the 
effect that equal pay and other sex equality initiatives have had in 
stimulating proposals for gender fairness in tort law since they first 
appeared in the mid-1970s.  It is at this point that the line between 
accuracy and aspiration becomes blurred.  It is possible to shape the 
future in a certain way, in part by predicting that it will take that 
shape.  When courts award damages for loss of earning capacity in 
tort litigation, they do more than passively pass on the market price 
of plaintiff=s labor; they express a view about the future and should 
not be oblivious to their own role in constructing that future.
The willingness of economists and courts to rely on sex and race 
as a measure of an individual=s future earning potential may have as 
much to do with habit as it does with strict fidelity to the restitutio
principle.  With respect to future earnings capacity, the judgment to 
select race and gender over other possible predictors may be affected 
by a cognitive bias that overstates the importance of the highly 
salient personal characteristics of race and sex.100  Thus, I suspect 
that if the data clearly indicated, for example, that Catholics earned 
higher incomes on the average than Baptists, courts would be 
reluctant to predict future earning capacity based on religious 
denomination.101  In such cases, there would likely be a sense that 
98. See, e.g., Walker v. Ritchie [2003] O.J. No. 18 at ¶¶ 134–35 (Ont. Sup. 
Ct. J.) (QL), 2003 CarswellOnt 10 (Can.).
99. McInnes, supra note 88, at 155.
100. For a fuller development of this argument, see Martha Chamallas, The 
Architecture of Bias: Deep Structures in Tort Law, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 463, 
484–89 (1998).
101. See id. at 486 n.81 (describing regression analysis indicating that for 
years 1991, 1992, and 1994, Catholics were almost one and one-half times 
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using religion as a variable was somehow inappropriate, even if it 
seemed to have predictive value.  The objection to using religion 
would be based on a judgment that any past disparity in income 
between Catholics and Baptists was not a function of a lasting 
difference between the two groups, but more likely explainable in 
terms of opportunities that were historically disproportionately 
available to higher earning Catholics.  The argument would be that 
using religion to predict future income is not only inappropriate, but 
inaccurate, because as opportunity structures change, religion will 
cease to be a valid predictor of the future.  Thus, because Baptists as 
a group presumably do not possess personal traits that would prevent 
them from gaining income parity in the future, it is unjust to saddle 
individual tort victims who happen to be Baptist with the legacy of a 
discriminatory past.
In contrast, I believe that what lies behind the willingness to use 
race and sex to predict future economic loss is the unspoken 
assumption that, regardless of equal opportunity initiatives, race and 
gender will continue to be powerful predictors of income because, in 
the final analysis, women and racial minorities lack what it takes to 
compete with white men in the workplace.102  In this context, the 
selective use of race and gender as a supposedly accurate measure of 
the future has the effect of naturalizing racial and gender differences 
and eclipsing the role that lack of opportunities and the persistence of 
racial and sex bias play in producing pay disparities in the 
workplace.  Relying on race and sex-based statistics reinforces the 
view that race and sex differences are inevitable and enduring, rather 
than a product of political and social arrangements that are subject to 
change.  What looks on the surface to be a hard-boiled argument 
about accuracy turns out to implicate the politically-charged debate 
about the sources of disparities in our society and the role of law and 
the courts in reproducing patterns of inequality.
Along a similar vein, the current debate about privatizing Social 
Security shows how race-based statistics can sometimes be 
uncritically accepted as objective fact, without noticing that 
projections of the future inevitably involve speculation and political 
judgments that cannot flatly be declared to be either accurate or 
more likely than Baptists to have a household income above $25,000).
102. Id. at 487.
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inaccurate.  In a recent editorial, Paul Krugman criticized President 
Bush=s claim that Social Security was a bad deal for African 
Americans.  The Bush position is that statistics show that African 
American males die sooner than other males and thus do not live 
long enough to collect their fair share of benefits.103  Krugman 
argued that such use of race-based life expectancy statistics was 
misleading for a variety of reasons,104 one of which was that it took 
“as a given that 40 or 50 years from now, large numbers of African-
Americans will still be dying before their time.”105  Krugman likened 
such an assumption to a “bigotry of low expectations”106 and one 
likely to shift focus away from the variable quality of available 
health care in the United States and a black infant mortality rate that 
is two and one-half times higher than that of white infants.107
Thus, even if the only concern of tort law was to accurately 
measure losses, the foregoing arguments indicate that continued 
reliance on gender and race-based tables would not achieve that 
objective.  However, it is also important to recognize that the starting 
assumption that undergirds the argument in favor of gender and race-
based tables—the assumption that the only legitimate concern of tort 
law is accuracy—is also highly debatable.108  Even a traditionalist 
scholar, such as noted treatise writer Dan Dobbs, introduces students 
to tort law by explaining that tort law is not limited to corrective 
justice ideals, such as the restitutio principle in damages, but has also 
been shaped by ideals of distributive justice and by public policy 
concerns that look at the impact of tort rules on how goods are 
103. See Paul Krugman, Little Black Lies, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2005, at 
A21.
104. Krugman stressed that President Bush=s remarks perpetuated a “crude 
misunderstanding about what life expectancy means.”  Id. He explained that 
low life expectancy for black males is largely due to high death rates in 
childhood and young adulthood and that African-American men who live to 65 





108. See, e.g., Christine Jolls, Behavioral Economics Analysis of 
Redistributive Legal Rules, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1653 (1998) (disputing 
contention that tax and welfare laws are a more efficient means of 
redistribution than private law). 
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distributed within the larger society.109
Because both corrective and distributive justice ideals, including 
a concern for group equality, can be found in tort law, the public 
dimension of tort law should not be overlooked.110  To give just one 
prominent example, consider the public policy exception to the at-
will employment rule that gained strength in the 1970s and served to 
redistribute a measure of wealth from employers to discharged 
employees.111  This doctrinal reform was prompted by concerns that 
looked beyond the individual parties to the dispute, as courts took the 
position that employers should not always be free to use their power 
to terminate workers in ways that undermined larger societal goals.  
Notably, one of the earliest cases to endorse the public policy 
exception was a sexual harassment case in which the court held that 
it violated the state’s public policy to allow a private employer to 
terminate a female employee for refusing to have sex with her 
foreman.112  In that case, the court balanced the public interest in 
fostering sex equality against the employer=s interest in running its 
business, i.e., the court deemed it proper to consider distributive ends 
in shaping the private law.
Because distributional considerations have affected the shape of 
tort law, the key question in my view is not whether it is ever proper 
to deviate from tort law principles to interject distributional 
considerations, but whether social justice concerns ought to influence 
the shape of the particular tort rule in question.  As Canadian scholar 
Elizabeth Adjin-Tettey has pointed out, to insist that distributional 
concerns have no place in tort law presupposes that the status quo is 
fair and equitable and deserves to be replicated.  In criticizing such a 
narrow corrective justice position, she argues that “corrective justice 
is only aimed at formal equality.  It does not question the justice of 
the status quo or the relative positions of the parties.”113
When seemingly neutral tort rules replicate an unequal status 
quo, it becomes that much more difficult for disadvantaged social 
109. DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 9, 13–16 (2001) (“Tort law often 
takes policy and utility into account as well as rights or corrective justice.”).
110. See Adjin-Tettey, supra note 47, at 341–47.
111. For a general discussion of the public policy exception, see MARK A. 
ROTHSTEIN ET AL., EMPLOYMENT LAW 9.9, at 438–43 (3d ed. 2004).
112. Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 316 A.2d 549, 550–51 (N.H. 1974).
113. Adjin-Tettey, supra note 47, at 344.
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groups to bring about social change.  In a recent Canadian law 
journal, for example, Tsachi Keren-Paz discussed the Asystematic 
regressive effects@ of the Learned Hand formula.114  Building on the 
scholarship of Richard Abel,115 Keren-Paz starts from the insight that 
under the Hand definition of negligence, “it is cheaper to harm poor 
victims than rich ones,”116 and thus “the existing tort system provides 
incentive to tortfeasors to harm the disadvantaged.”117  He gives an 
example in which AJ.R.@ is deciding where to build a refinery.118  J.R. 
knows that there is a safety device costing $800,000 that would 
decrease the probability of an explosion by half, from 0.2 to 0.1.  An 
explosion would cause $10M in damages in Richtown, but only $7M 
in Poortown, because of differences in property values and future 
lost earnings.  Thus, the savings in expected loss from installing the 
device in Poortown is only $700,000 (.1 x $7M), less than the cost of 
the device.  However, the savings in expected loss in Richtown is 
$1M (.1 x $10M), more than the cost of the device.  The Hand 
formula instructs that J.R. is negligent if he builds the plant without 
the safety device in Richtown, but that he is not negligent if he builds 
it in Poortown.  The upshot is that if the plant is ultimately built in 
Poortown and an explosion occurs, the residents will have to absorb 
the $7M loss without the benefit of tort compensation, making 
Poortown that much poorer.
My argument is that the current method of relying on race-based 
and gender-based tables to calculate lost earnings potential has 
similar regressive effects.  This is most evident when large scale 
harm disproportionately affects members of a minority group, as in 
the example of lead paint victims discussed earlier.119  The regressive 
effect is present, however, whenever the measurement of damages is 
based exclusively on a market that is itself not free from gender and 
race bias.  The important point to recognize here is that because the 
114. See Tsachi Keren-Paz, An Inquiry into the Merits of Redistribution 
Through Tort Law: Rejecting the Claim of Randomness, 16 CAN. J. L. & 
JURIS. 91, 94–95 (2003).
115. See Richard L. Abel, A Critique of Torts, 37 UCLA. L. REV. 785, 822–
31 (1990).
116. Keren-Paz, supra note 114, at 94.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 95–97 (containing example).
119. See supra notes 28–30 and accompanying text.
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status quo is neither natural, nor always fair,120 injecting gender and 
race equity into tort rules serves a neutralizing function, as a modest 
corrective offsetting built-in regressive effects.  Thus, critics of the 
use of gender and race-based tables tend to frame their arguments in 
the alternative—first, emphasizing that the traditional approach does 
not lead to accuracy and, alternatively, arguing that accuracy is not 
everything.
Once we get beyond the concern for accuracy, the scholarly 
debate over the proper measurement of damages for lost earning 
capacity becomes more of a discussion about the advisable scope of 
reform, rather than a defense of gender and race-based tables.  The 
concerns on the “left” address a variety of specific issues but tend to 
focus on the incomplete or incremental nature of some of the 
proposals to change the method of calculating future income loss and 
generally express a desire for more radical reform of tort law.  Cast 
in its broadest terms, the issue is whether compensation in tort should 
be fundamentally redirected, away from its current reliance on the 
market in computing compensable losses more toward a system that 
would determine compensation in accord with individual need.  
Perhaps not surprisingly, given the difference in political climate in 
Canada and the United States, Canadian scholars have been more 
willing to advocate needs-based reform.121  My scholarship, in 
contrast, is less utopian and reflects the limited prospects for 
widespread progressive tort reform in the United States.  
With respect to the use of blended tables for plaintiffs with no 
track record of earnings,122 there are three Aincompleteness@ concerns 
that are interrelated and most likely to surface in any future debate.  
The first and second relates to the class of plaintiffs who would 
directly benefit from the reform.  The third relates to the alternative 
method of computing losses the law should endorse.
120. For a more theoretical discussion of this point, see MARTHA MINOW, 
MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION, AND AMERICAN LAW
70–78 (1990) (disputing the unstated assumption that the status quo is “natural, 
uncoerced and good”).
121. See, e.g., Cassels, supra note 78; Jamie Cassels, Damages for Lost 
Earning Capacity: Women and Children Last!, 71 CAN. B. REV. 445 (1992); 
Elaine Gibson, The Gendered Wage Dilemma in Personal Injury Damages in
TORT THEORY 185, 209–11 (Ken Cooper Stephenson & Elaine Gibson eds., 
1993).
122. See supra notes 52–53, 73–76.
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The first concern arises from the fact that the proposal covers 
only those injured parties with no established earnings record and 
would have an impact principally in cases involving young tort 
victims.123  This means that the large majority of female and minority 
plaintiffs would not see their awards increased because their awards 
would continue to be calculated using their current earnings as a
baseline.  Thus, an adult female tort victim who worked in a low-
paying predominately female occupation would not benefit from the 
proposal, except insofar as her worklife expectancy were increased 
by the use of gender-neutral tables.  Because the proposal applies 
mainly to young tort victims, it does not address the situation of large 
numbers of adult women who suffer pay inequities as a result of 
gender segregation in the labor market.124  As the debate over 
comparable worth has shown,125 any reform that does not challenge 
job segregation is bound to be limited.  A more radical proposal, for 
example, would allow adult women plaintiffs to receive an award 
based on average earnings (using blended or male tables) to make up 
for the devaluation of predominately female jobs.
Despite its limited effect, restricting reform to plaintiffs without 
an established earnings record makes sense to me, at least in the 
short run, precisely because it does not require a radical redirection 
of the basis for calculating damages in tort.  The proposal authorizes 
use of general statistics only in those instances where resort to more 
individually-based assessments is not feasible.  It thus does little to 
disturb the resitutio principle of tort compensation and still fits 
within an overall corrective justice orientation to tort law.  Because 
at this moment in history, the individualistic focus of tort law in the 
United States is so solidly entrenched, it is highly unlikely that any 
123. There are also some unusual cases in which the victim suffers injury as 
a young child but does not sue until many years later, such as a child 
molestation case against an abusive parent. See, e.g., D v. F., [1995] B.C. J. 
No. 1478 (Can.), discussed in McInnes, supra note 88, at 165–66.  The court in 
such cases would have to decide whether the abuse lowered the plaintiff’s past 
and future ability to earn even if the plaintiff had already “chosen” a career 
path.
124. Nor does it address any gender pay discrimination suffered in the past 
by the individual plaintiff beyond that which is traceable to working in a 
predominantly female job.
125. For a discussion of some of the major sources addressing the issue of 
comparable worth, see KATHARINE T. BARTLETT ET AL., GENDER AND LAW: 
THEORY, DOCTRINE, COMMENTARY 303–20 (3d ed. 2002).
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reform that departed substantially from it would gain much support.  
Compared to a proposal that would allow an adult plaintiff to 
measure economic loss by reference to average earnings, moreover, 
my proposal avoids grappling with the related and equally difficult 
question of whether individual tort victims—male or female—whose 
economic loss is above the average should be fully compensated in 
tort.126  Proposed reforms that extend to plaintiffs with established 
earnings records would more directly challenge the historical 
practice of basing tort recoveries on the market-based earnings 
history of the individual plaintiff, and for that very reason, may die 
on the vine.  Finally, I would note that, for those young female and 
minority plaintiffs covered by the proposal, it is not a meager reform: 
because the proposal computes loss of future earnings capacity on 
blended tables of average wages overall, not on the lower wage rates 
of predominantly female or minority jobs, it ameliorates disparities 
arising from devaluation of those jobs to some degree.
The second concern stems from that fact that the proposal 
prohibits resort to gender-based and race-based data only and does 
not attempt to deal directly with disparities that arise from social 
class or family background.  Admittedly, this limitation is most 
important in the subset of cases in which the proposal operates, 
namely, when the plaintiff is young and has no established track 
record of earnings.  In those cases, an expert estimating a plaintiff=s 
lost future earning capacity will typically first determine the level of 
education the plaintiff would likely have attained, e.g., a high school, 
community college, or university education.  After making that 
determination, the next step is to look at a table of average wages for 
that category, often further divided by gender and/or race.  As 
framed, the proposal does not take issue with an expert’s initial 
determination and reliance on educational attainment in determining 
average wages and instead targets only the factors of gender and 
race.
The case law demonstrates that predicting what level of 
educational attainment plaintiff would have achieved absent the 
injury is both an important determination and one that is not always 
126. See, e.g., Chamallas, supra note 45, at 67–69 (describing the 
controversy surrounding the decision by the September 11th Special Master to 
presumptively cap economic damages at a yearly salary of $231,000, 
representing the 98th percentile of individual income in the United States).
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easy to make.127  Although courts will generally consider plaintiff=s 
expressed career desires and any educational accomplishments prior 
to the accident the plaintiff can document (e.g., grades in school, 
scores on standardized tests), there is often not that much in the 
record to go on.  Thus, it is not unusual for courts also to consider the 
educational level of plaintiff’s parents and the level and type of 
education that the siblings of the plaintiffs have received,128 two 
variables that are closely tied to social class.  Children from poor or 
working-class backgrounds are therefore likely to recover 
significantly lower awards than children from middle and upper class 
homes.  To this degree, the method of calculating lost future income 
has a tendency to reproduce social class, in much the same way that 
reliance on gender and race-based tables perpetuates race and gender 
disparities in society.  A more comprehensive egalitarian approach 
would simply be to set the award for loss of future income at average 
earnings in all cases involving child plaintiffs.
Such an average earnings approach has its appeal, particularly 
because it would obviate the need for speculative predictions that 
might prove hurtful to plaintiffs and their families, where, for 
example, an expert concludes that the plaintiff would probably not 
have gone on to college. Nevertheless, in my opinion, a proposal 
limited to race and gender that allows estimates to be based in part 
on predicted level of education and other class-inflected factors 
remains the single best reform at this time.
There are three reasons why I would limit reform to gender and 
race.  First, as mentioned above, there is a decided preference for 
individualized determinations in U.S. tort law. Despite its possible 
class bias, the determination of the level of educational attainment 
the plaintiff would have achieved (and the career the plaintiff might 
have pursued) is essentially an individualized determination that 
involves considerations of a variety of factors, rather than a simple 
classification of the plaintiff into a social category.  Unlike 
classifying the plaintiff as male or female, or white or black, this 
127. See, e.g., Gilborges v. Wallace, 379 A.2d 269, 276–77 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
App. Div. 1977) (selecting among three possible amounts depending on 
differing levels of educational attainment).
128. See, e.g., Ross (Guardian ad litem of) v. Watts, [1997] B.C.J. No. 1998 
(B.C.S.C.) (QL), at para. 118, 121, 144, 1997 CarswellBC 1901 (Can.); 
Athridge v. Iglesias, 950 F. Supp. 1187, 1193 –94 (D.D.C. 1996).
http://law.bepress.com/osulwps/art16
18025-TEXT.NATIVE.1117119517PROF_CHAMALLAS_CLEAN.DOCCHAMALLAS_PRINTREADY5/26/20055/9/20054/14/2005 8:01 AM12:45:38 PM4:51 PM
Month 200x] DESKTOP PUBLISHING EXAMPLE 129
factual determination can be “opened up” to take into account more 
factors, simultaneously making the determination more 
individualized and less class-biased.  Thus, relying on what is known 
as the psychological theory of “resiliency,”129 commentators have 
urged experts and courts not to overlook those “protective factors” in 
a person’s life that lead to success and allow many to rise to the top 
despite adversity.130  For example, although poverty is a significant 
risk factor that reduces the chance for economic success later in life, 
in some cases, a strong “multigenerational network of kin and 
friends” can help an individual overcome the risk and be upwardly 
mobile.131 Particularly because the determination of lost future 
incapacity is aimed at measuring human potential, it seems desirable 
to encourage individualized evidence that tends to deconstruct 
potential and to show how it is not always dependent on social class.  
Thus, there is less need in this instance to rely on average statistics to 
reduce class bias and achieve more egalitarian results.
Second, under our constitutional system, classifications based on 
sex and race have been treated differently, and with a much greater 
degree of suspicion, than class-based distinctions. It is well 
established, for example, that legislation that is disproportionately 
harmful to low-income persons is not entitled to heightened scrutiny 
and will not be struck down by courts unless it is utterly irrational.132
This feature of constitutional law is also reflected in the larger social 
discourse that tends to regard race and gender distinctions as more 
controversial than distinctions based on social class, at least insofar 
as ability to pay is the measure of social class.  Thus, I believe it 
would be far easier for courts and legislatures to support the notion 
that, as a matter of public policy, a plaintiff’s race or sex should play 
no role in determining a damage award, than it would be to convince 
them that it is wrong to consider predicted educational levels in 
setting damage awards because this tends to disadvantage poor and 
working-class children.
129. See Greenberg, supra note 28, at 453–58.
130. Id. at 455–56.
131. Id. at 456 (quoting EMMY E. WERNER & RUTH S. SMITH, VULNERABLE 
BUT INVINCIBLE: A LONGITUDINAL STUDY OF RESILIENT CHILDREN AND 
YOUTH 155 (1982)).
132. See San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 17–29 
(1973) (declaring that poverty is not a suspect classification and that 
discrimination against the poor receives only rational basis review).
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Finally, I would point out that eliminating race and sex-based 
calculations will to some degree capture and reduce class-based 
disparities.  There is no dispute that racial minority groups are 
disproportionately poor, and addressing race-based disparities will 
help to ameliorate poverty for plaintiffs who fall within these groups.  
Moreover, because there is a correlation between poverty and being 
female—as the phrase “the feminization of poverty” so well 
describes133—eliminating explicit gender bias has a progressive class 
effect for women as a group.  One needy group that will not benefit 
from the proposal as it is framed is non-minority, low-income men 
because their disadvantage stems exclusively from social class.
The third and most troubling concern relates to which method 
for computing loss of future income capacity should be adopted, 
once it is decided that the use of gender and race-based tables are 
inappropriate.  To date, there has been a split in opinion.  My 
proposal aligns with those courts—most prominently the 
Wheeler134and Bedonie135 decisions in the United States and the 
Walker136 ruling in Canada—that have chosen to rely on blended 
tables for both men and women.  However, there is also strong 
support for using the higher male tables for all plaintiffs, as the 9/11 
Special Master137 elected to do and as reflected in some court 
rulings138 and thoughtful commentary in Canada.139  It does not take 
long to realize that the choice of tables is significant: under the 
blended tables, men, including some minority men,140 would receive 
lower awards than under the old system and women of all races 
would receive higher awards using male tables than if blended tables 
were selected.
133. See, e.g., Vicki Lens, Supreme Court Narratives On Equality And 
Gender Discrimination in Employment, 10 CARDOZO WOMEN’S L.J. 501, 510–
11 (2004).
134. Wheeler Tarpeh-Doe v. United States, 771 F. Supp. 427, 455 (D.D.C. 
1991), rev’d on other grounds, 28 F.3d 120 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
135. United States v. Bedonie, 317 F. Supp. 1285, 1319 (D. Utah 2004).
136. Walker v. Ritchie [2003] O.J. No. 18 at ¶ 135–36 (Ont. Sup. Ct. 
J.)(QL), 2003 CarswellOnt 10 (Can.).
137. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
138. See supra note 78 (collecting cases).
139. See Adjin-Tettey, supra note 47.
140. See Wheeler Tarpeh-Doe, 771 F. Supp. at 456 (noting that minority 
male plaintiff recovered less using blended tables than he would have using 
race-based male tables).
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At the outset, it is important to counter an initial objection that 
might be made to use of male tables, namely, that because the male 
tables amount to gender-specific classifications, they are subject to 
the same objections as the use of female-specific tables.  Such an 
argument is simply untenable in this remedial context.  Behind the 
constitutional prohibition and public policy objection to gender 
classifications lies the principle that men and women should not be 
subject to disparate standards under the law, that there should be a 
uniform rule governing both sexes.  Thus, as counterintuitive as it 
may initially seem, there is no constitutional infirmity with using 
male tables for all plaintiffs, precisely because both sexes are being
treated identically.
In my view, the core of the debate behind the choice of remedies 
can be found in two important inquiries: whether use of blended 
tables would result in undercompensation of women (and men) and 
whether courts could reliably resort to male tables, without also 
reinforcing longstanding stereotypes of women as marginal workers 
whose primary career is motherhood and domestic labor.  I regard 
both as close questions, but ultimately come down in favor of using 
blended tables to determine loss of future income in the United 
States.
The argument against use of blended tables starts with the 
proposition that women’s wages have been depressed because of a 
variety of gender-biased practices and policies: the devaluation of 
women’s work, the inequitable treatment of part-time workers and 
the social perception that as the primary caretakers of children, 
women are less committed to their jobs. Given these features of the 
labor market, opponents of blended tables reason that because such 
tables combine depressed average female wages and average male 
wages, they still are tainted by discrimination and thus are an 
inappropriate measure of earning potential.141  They prefer to use the 
higher, nondiscriminatory male figures for everyone.  Under this 
view, the remedy should be to “level up” women to the higher male 
standard142 and thereby ensure that no one’s award is lowered as a 
141. Id. at 321–22.
142. For a discussion of the choice to level up or level down as a remedy for 
equal protection violations, see Deborah L. Brake, When Equality Leaves 
Everybody Worse Off: The Problem of Leveling Down in Equality Law, 46 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 513 (2004).
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result of the reform.143
I have no quarrel with the first important observation about the 
gender-biased features of the labor market that have a depressing 
effect on women=s wages. In my view, there is ample evidence of 
widespread discrimination in and devaluation of the work that 
women perform.144  However, I am less convinced by the corollary 
arguments that the male wage rate is fair and nondiscriminatory or 
that the male standard is the preferable standard to use in this 
context.  Instead, we have reason to believe that the male rate may be 
inflated because some men are earning above the market or fair rate.  
Thus, in their case studies of pay equity cases, Robert L. Nelson and 
William P. Bridges found that there were gender pay disparities in 
both the private and public sector, in part because of a built-in inertia 
in pay scales within organizations that resulted in paying women 
wages at or below the market, while paying some groups of men well 
above the market rate.145  In other words, in the world of wages, it is 
probably the case that there is both female disadvantage and male 
privilege.  The key question becomes whether some of that male 
privilege is unjustified.  Particularly in an era where there is great 
political pressure to reduce tort awards, it seems important not to 
press for a reform that will produce an increase in awards overall, if 
the major inequity is in the distribution of awards.  When it comes to 
economic loss, women and minorities may deserve a larger slice of 
the pie, but I am not sure that the pie should be enlarged.
Perhaps equally as important, I am concerned about the message 
that endorsement of the use of male tables might send to courts, 
experts, and other actors in the legal process.  As mentioned earlier, 
use of male tables in this context is not truly a gender-specific 
practice because the male tables are used as a proxy for a fair, 
143. Using the male standard would also track the approach of the Equal Pay 
Act, 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(3) (2000), which makes it unlawful to reduce the pay 
of any employee in order to comply with the Act.  The employer’s only option 
is to raise the pay of women to the male rate.
144. See CHAMALLAS, supra note 13, at 187–92 (discussing devaluation of 
predominately female jobs and part-time work).
145. See Martha Chamallas, The Market Excuse, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 579, 
586–87, 593, 595 (2001) (reviewing ROBERT L. NELSON & WILLIAM P. 
BRIDGES, LEGALIZING GENDER INEQUALITY: COURTS, MARKETS, AND 
UNEQUAL PAY FOR WOMEN IN AMERICA (1999)).
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nondiscriminatory measure of earnings.146  However, I suspect that 
many courts will nonetheless balk at using the male tables in cases in 
which they conclude that the injured female plaintiff would likely 
have followed a Afemale@ career path, for example, where a young 
girl expressed the wish to become a pre-school teacher and her sister 
had already chosen such a path.  Even if this is not the intent of 
reformers, use of male tables might well reinforce a gender-
consciousness in this area, particularly because the issue involves 
such “gendered” topics as occupational choice, duration of working 
life, and potential income.  It has been my experience that when there 
is talk about “gender difference” in the workplace, it is often code for 
“women’s inferiority,” making it hard to notice gender without also 
reinforcing women=s subordinate status.  Among the most resilient 
stereotypes relating to women workers are maternal stereotypes,147
namely, that women are better suited to homemaking and domestic 
life, than to work and public life.  For me, a decided advantage of 
using blended, rather than male, tables is that it does not highlight the 
gender of the prototypical worker and thus does not subtly encourage 
decision makers to question whether the particular plaintiff is “male” 
enough to qualify for the higher rate of compensation.  Finally, there 
is the hope that endorsement of blended tables will encourage 
economists and government data collectors to generate new and 
more refined gender and race-neutral tables and will expose the need 
for infusing gender equity into the methods adopted and used by 
non-legal professionals.
In the final analysis, I find the use of blended, gender and race-
neutral tables an appealing solution because such an approach does 
not produce a false neutrality, but instead relies on a composite 
measure that incorporates the experiences of both men and women 
and persons of diverse races. I realize that advocacy of gender 
neutrality or color blindness can have perverse effects, if it serves 
only to produce formal equality and actually deepens the substantive 
disparities between social groups. In computing future income 
capacity, however, use of blended tables will substantively raise 
146. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
147. See Joan C. Williams & Nancy Segal, Beyond the Maternal Wall: Relief 
for Family Caregivers who are Discriminated Against on the Job, 26 HARV. 
WOMEN=S L.J. 77, 90–98 (2003) (discussing the content of stereotypes 
affecting mothers and other caregivers in the workplace).
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awards for women plaintiffs and will lessen disparities traceable to 
race. I favor such a solution because it is a formal, easily understood 
reform that will make a substantive difference.
http://law.bepress.com/osulwps/art16
